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Abstract 
Background Entering passwords on mobile devices often takes place in 
public, situations in which input actions are exposed to the people around you 
and passwords can be compromised simply by sneaky glances over shoulders. 
However, the people who surround a user are typically not malicious attackers 
seeking to steal data, but rather friends and colleagues. This article characterizes 
such individuals as casual observers and describes the threats they pose to security 
and password integrity.
Methods Based on an analysis of the literature and design space, we 
introduce a systematic framework for multiplexed authentication, a term we 
introduce to describe a class of systems that maintain security against the threats 
posed by casual observers through obsfuscated input. Building on this knowledge, 
we present a set of design dimensions and guidelines for multiplexed graphical 
passwords. Finally, we present ShaPIN, a multiplexed input prototype designed in 
light of these guidelines and that aims to protect users against casual observation.  
Results Evaluations of ShaPIN with a user study reveal it can be used 
rapidly, accurately and that it provides protection against in-person observation. 
ShaPIN also offers substantial performance imporvements over prior systems in 
its class, evidence that helps support and validate our design framework. 
Conclusion We believe that the framework of multiplexed authentication 
can inform and shape future work to ensure that passwords stay safe and secret 
in front of friends. By presenting design guidelines for multiplexed graphical 
passwords we also hope to raise awareness of the important issue of password 
security in the design community and to show how design research can innovate 
in this area to create more usable and effective password systems.
Keywords Casual Observer, Password Design, Dsign Guidelines, Multiplexed 
Input.
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1. Introduction
Look away!  When your colleagues are logging in to their computers, that’s 
how the US Department of Homeland Security recommends you behave. 
After all, they continue, those passwords are protecting national secrets 
so its only “common courtesy” (Huth, 2013) to avert your eyes. Jacob Nielsen 
(2009), a prominent design usability guru, seems to agree. He argues 
password masking, the common practice of substituting entered password 
characters with unintelligible asterisks in web forms, violates usability 
principles and should be stopped. How many passwords, he asks, are really 
stolen via observation, via surreptitious glances that peak over shoulders? 
Bruce Schenier (2014), a leading figure and author in practical computer 
security, paints a more nuanced picture. The importance of observation 
attacks depends on the context of use - there is little risk when users are 
entering long, complex encryption keys in the privacy of their own homes. 
But when out and about, accessing devices and services in public places 
or operating public terminals such as ATMs, it is a different story. Moreover, 
not only are users surrounded by strangers, but also potentially by peers, 
co-workers and friends - should the secrecy of our passwords be protected 
simply by the social convention that other users will avert their gaze or 
should we design technologies that protect passwords from these kinds of 
casual, and most likely benevolent, observers?  
In fact, password observation is an important issue for pervasive mobile 
and wearable intearctive devices. These personal tools manage and access 
increasing quantities of important and potentially sensitive information - 
email accounts, banking applications and social networking services. They 
are also used in an incredibly wide range of public contexts and with almost 
unprecedented frequency - recent estimates suggest users open their mobiles 
phones up to 150 times per day (Meeker, 2013), or roughly once every five 
to ten waking minutes. Furthermore, many applications on a mobile are 
protected only by the system level password - after a device is unlocked 
the majority of its contents, features, data and services are freely and fully 
available. In reality, we argue that publicly exposing device passwords is far 
from a desirable situation. 
Despite these concerns, and in stark contrast to the arcane password policies 
present in most desktop computing environments, many users intentionally 
opt for simplistic password schemes for their devices - or none at all. Possibly 
due to the frequency with which devices are accessed, or a perception of 
safety conferred via possession, security is typically seen as obstructing 
a user’s activity and work (Sasse, 2011). Ref lecting this trend towards 
simplicity, companies have introduced lightweight, rapid authentication 
systems for mobiles. A prominent example is the Android pattern lock (Figure 
1, left), a graphical password scheme in which users make a single stroke 
to connect between two and nine dots arranged in a grid. Its quick, error 
tolerant and highly popular. It also offers negligible resistance to observation 
– a single glance can be enough to learn a password and even post-hoc 
observation, based on examining the smears left on the touch-screen, can be 
effectively used to extract the secret pattern (Aviv, 2010).
This weakness poses particular issues for what we term casual observers 
- the colleagues and peers who may accidentally learn passwords simply 
by failing to look away at the critical moment of entry. Given the growing 
and preferential use of tablets, mobiles and other pervasive devices in 
entertainment and collaborative work activities and indeed the physical 
sharing of such devices during these tasks (Rogers, 2009), we argue that 
is not always possible to maintain the Department of Homeland Security’s 
recommended etiquette. Even without malicious motives, looking away 
is not as easy as it sounds and not knowing can become a chore. This is 
problematic as, beyond the fundamental security issues, conspicuously 
protecting passwords (such as cupping a hand around the input field, as in 
Figure 1, right) or inadvertently revealing or learning them can result in 
social discomfort, embarrassment or awkwardness (Sasse, 2011). 
Figure 1 Two casual observation scenarios. On the left, a user authenticates with the Android 
Pattern Lock on a busy subway. On the right, a user conceals his password entry process from a 
colleague by cupping his hand over a tablet screen.
To address these issues, this article discusses interaction techniques that 
provide resistance to in-person observation. It focuses on protecting 
passwords from casual observers, benevolent peers who are near a user 
during authentication, by introducing multiplexed authentication, a novel 
framing for systems that feature visually obfuscated input. We then draw 
out key design dimensions of the space, highlight tradeoffs and make 
recommendations in the form of a defined set of design guidelines for future 
systems. We conclude by describing two recent multiplexed authentication 
schemes we have implemented and summarize the results of the studies we 
have conducted on them.
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2. Casual Observers
In computer security, attackers are typically viewed as nefarious, dedicated 
and smart. Security schemes need consider the worst possible scenarios to 
be effective and, in the research community, there are kudos to be gained by 
coming up with novel ways to crack existing systems. Common standards 
have emerged for the threat models by which systems can be attacked. For 
basic techniques such as brute force guessing, the required security level 
varies with the use context - for systems on public terminals, schemes 
with 10,000 possible passwords (e.g. four digit ATM PINs) are common. 
In contrast, online systems, which can be subject to exhaustive, automated 
remote attacks, typically use much larger password spaces. Mobile devices, 
with their focus on the usability of authentication interfaces and the 
additional implicit security conferred by device possession tend to focus on 
the lower end of this scale. 
There are fewer standards for observation resistance, but typical studies 
assume attackers with access to clear, high-resolution video of users making 
one or more successful authentications and ample time to review and extract 
password contents through careful analysis of this media. However, just like 
required resistance to brute-force attack varies from situation to situation, 
we argue that resistance to observation is best defined contextually. Other 
researchers agree. Hayashi et al. (2013) reveals that more than half of the 
logins on mobile devices happen at home or work, locations they characterize 
as low risk and suitable for relatively weak authentication schemes with a 
high level of usability. One component of this argument is simply that the 
people that surround a user in these environments are family members, 
friends and colleagues - individuals who, despite their proximity, are 
very unlikely to intentionally steal passwords. This article characterizes 
these individuals as casual observers and the threat they pose as one of 
inadvertently discovering passwords by failing to maintain privacy preserving 
behaviors such as averting their eyes when another users authenticates. In 
this framing, the goal of providing resistance to observation is not to lock 
down a system against a dedicated attacker, but to ensure that benevolent 
individuals who accidentally observe user authentications remain ignorant of 
password contents. 
Distilling this discussion into concrete conclusions, we isolate four specific 
qualities of the casual observation threat model. Firstly, casual observers are 
non-malicious. Secondly, they observe password entry in person and close-
up, often while sharing the same device. Thirdly, they take no notes nor 
record any video of entry processes. Fourthly, as long-term peers of a user, 
they are exposed to repeated observations of authentication sessions, both 
in a single sitting and over time. While this model differs considerably from 
traditional security threat models, we believe it has value in identifying, 
exposing and ultimately designing to tackle the predominantly social issues 
around unintentional password disclosure to peers. 
3. Multiplexed passwords schemes
Guarding against casual observers involves making input that is undisclosed 
or ambiguous to a nearby person capable of seeing every part of the 
interaction: hands, screen and pointing device. One way to achieve this 
is to design interfaces that map a single input event to multiple on-screen 
password items. In this way, an individual who observes the authentication 
is unable to determine exactly what password item was selected by any given 
input. In this article, we introduce the term multiplexed authentication 
to refer to these systems. The name reflects the fact that a user’s intended 
selection is mixed and combined with one or more alternatives in order to 
obfuscate their password. 
Reflecting the importance of observation as a security threat, the literature 
provides a range of examples of multiplexed systems. In some of the earliest 
work on this idea, Tan and colleagues (2005) presented a spy-resistant 
keyboard based on a 14 by 3 grid of tiles each containing a set of three 
random characters. One character in each tile was always highlighted 
and users made selections by toggling through the highlighted items in 
conjunction with selecting a specific tile. In this way, neither the highlight 
nor the tile selection was sufficient for an observer to determine which 
character was selected - both had to be combined. Roth and colleagues (2004) 
proposed a conceptually related system for numeric PIN entry. It featured a 
standard numeric keypad, with a random set of half of the keys colored black 
and remainder colored white. Instead of tapping numbers, users repeatedly 
selected the colors of their PIN items. After three or four complete PIN 
entries (12 to 16 individual selections) the system could capture sufficient 
information to disambiguate the PIN, a feat the authors suggest that human 
observers would not be able to replicate. A more recent example is de Luca 
and colleagues’ ColorPIN (de Luca, 2010). It is based on a novel type of PIN 
composed of four number-color pairs (e.g. three-red or seven-black). 
It appears on screen as a large numeric keypad with three small 
alphabetic characters in three colors (black, white and red) underneath each 
digit. The characters repeat, so that each appears under three different keys, 
once in each different color. Users type the characters on a keyboard to select 
associated number-color pairs, a process that that confounds observation - 
each character input relates to three possible selections. 
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Similar concepts have been applied to graphical passwords. One example is 
the Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme (Wiedenback, 2006). In this system, 
many small icons are randomly positioned on screen. Most are superfluous, 
but between three and five of these belong to a user’s password. To enter 
a password item, users must locate at least three of their icons and click 
within the polygon they outline. As the click does not clearly relate to any of 
the icons shown, it is hard for an observer to deduce the password. Finally, 
PicassoPass (van Eekelen, 2013) is a recent and unevaluated example. It 
is based on a fixed grid of 12 compound icons each featuring a random 
color, shape, theme and character. A password is composed of individual 
elements, such as a shape or character, which users select by touching the 
compound item that contains them. Because all the content visually overlaps, 
an observer cannot distinguish which aspect of the compound icon a user 
actually selected and which aspects were present only incidentally. 
In summary, as this persistent research interest suggests, multiplexed 
authentication is a promising technique for increasing resistance to 
observation. But many issues remain. Compared to standard authentication 
interfaces, multiplexed systems trade usability for security. This becomes 
painfully clear via a cursory examination of password entry times for typical 
systems. These are reported to be between 13.5 (de Luca, 2010) and 71 
(Wiedenback, 2006) seconds, arguably too long for users in most tasks. 
To try to understand why, and isolate avenues for improvement, we present 
and discuss six design dimensions of multiplexed authentication system, 
providing practical guideance and reccomendations for each. The goal is 
expose the common elements underlying such systems and shed light on 
how performance can be boosted without sacrificing security. We intend this 
discussion to frame future work on multiplexed authentication by making 
recommendations for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of this class 
of system. The design dimensions and guidelines are presented in the next 
section.
4. Design guidelines for multiplexed input with graphical passwords
Randomization: A key element of multiplexed authentication is that 
interface components are randomly arranged on screen - buttons and icons 
are shuffled or colors and images are swapped. Without this randomization, 
an attacker would only have to note the physical movements a user performed 
in order to replicate the password - much like the status quo. However, 
because the elements are randomized users must process the displayed 
content to inform a decision about what to select. To maximize this behavior, 
in most current multiplexed systems, screen contents are randomized after 
every selection, multiple times during the course of entering a password 
(e.g. 10, 11, 12). While this is effective, it is also laborious and potentially 
cognitively taxing. We suggest that minimizing the use of randomization, 
ideally so that it occurs only once per full password entry (e.g., 13), is a 
desirable design goal that will improve the performance of multiplexed 
systems. 
Indirectness of Input: To enable selection of multiple on-screen elements 
via a single input action most current multiplexed systems require user’s 
make selections via a proxy - some distant interface element or tool. For 
example, in ColorPIN (de Luca, 2010) users don’t select number-color pairs 
directly, but they type on a keyboard the characters that are associated 
with them; in CHC (Wiedenback, 2006) users don’t select the icons in their 
password, but the space surrounding them. While this input indirection is 
the foundation of many multiplexed schemes, it also inherently presents 
users with a challenging task of mapping, processing or reconfiguring the 
displayed contents to determine what or where their actual input should be. 
This contrasts strongly with the simplicity of traditional direct selection 
authentication schemes - at the ATM “1” clearly and effectively signifies 
“1”. Accordingly, we argue that efforts to increase the directness of input 
mappings will increase the usability, and particularly the efficiency, of 
multiplexed schemes. 
Cognitive challenge: Authors have posed users with a range of cognitive 
challenges (sometimes called trapdoor games (Roth, 2004)) in order to 
achieve input indirection. In the simplest, users must recognize some quality 
of their password item - its color or shape for example. In more sophisticated 
systems, users must process or integrate information, such as determining 
the next tab highlight in Tan’s spy-resistant keyboard (2005). 
Finally, systems such as CHC (Wiedenback, 2006) pose even more 
complex tasks involving spatial cognition to determine what points are 
enclosed by a polygon. The security literature, as well as general HCI 
guidelines, suggests that simpler cognitive tasks are more rapidly and 
reliably performed. Recognition tasks, in which users select their password 
items from a set of visually presented possibilities, are typically viewed as 
optimal choices. As such, we suggest that multiplexed authentication systems 
should be designed around recognition tasks in order to support optimal 
performance. 
Category Count: Multiplexed schemes typically involve multiple 
orthogonal categories of password item - for example, the highlight and tiles 
of Tan’s spy-resistant keyboard (2005) or the colors and numbers of de Luca’s 
ColorPin (2010). The numbers of categories that appear vary considerably, 
ranging from the single black/white category of Roth’s PIN entry system 
(2004), to the five distinct categories of PicassoPass (van Eekelen, 2013). In 
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observation. But many issues remain. Compared to standard authentication 
interfaces, multiplexed systems trade usability for security. This becomes 
painfully clear via a cursory examination of password entry times for typical 
systems. These are reported to be between 13.5 (de Luca, 2010) and 71 
(Wiedenback, 2006) seconds, arguably too long for users in most tasks. 
To try to understand why, and isolate avenues for improvement, we present 
and discuss six design dimensions of multiplexed authentication system, 
providing practical guideance and reccomendations for each. The goal is 
expose the common elements underlying such systems and shed light on 
how performance can be boosted without sacrificing security. We intend this 
discussion to frame future work on multiplexed authentication by making 
recommendations for increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of this class 
of system. The design dimensions and guidelines are presented in the next 
section.
4. Design guidelines for multiplexed input with graphical passwords
Randomization: A key element of multiplexed authentication is that 
interface components are randomly arranged on screen - buttons and icons 
are shuffled or colors and images are swapped. Without this randomization, 
an attacker would only have to note the physical movements a user performed 
in order to replicate the password - much like the status quo. However, 
because the elements are randomized users must process the displayed 
content to inform a decision about what to select. To maximize this behavior, 
in most current multiplexed systems, screen contents are randomized after 
every selection, multiple times during the course of entering a password 
(e.g. 10, 11, 12). While this is effective, it is also laborious and potentially 
cognitively taxing. We suggest that minimizing the use of randomization, 
ideally so that it occurs only once per full password entry (e.g., 13), is a 
desirable design goal that will improve the performance of multiplexed 
systems. 
Indirectness of Input: To enable selection of multiple on-screen elements 
via a single input action most current multiplexed systems require user’s 
make selections via a proxy - some distant interface element or tool. For 
example, in ColorPIN (de Luca, 2010) users don’t select number-color pairs 
directly, but they type on a keyboard the characters that are associated 
with them; in CHC (Wiedenback, 2006) users don’t select the icons in their 
password, but the space surrounding them. While this input indirection is 
the foundation of many multiplexed schemes, it also inherently presents 
users with a challenging task of mapping, processing or reconfiguring the 
displayed contents to determine what or where their actual input should be. 
This contrasts strongly with the simplicity of traditional direct selection 
authentication schemes - at the ATM “1” clearly and effectively signifies 
“1”. Accordingly, we argue that efforts to increase the directness of input 
mappings will increase the usability, and particularly the efficiency, of 
multiplexed schemes. 
Cognitive challenge: Authors have posed users with a range of cognitive 
challenges (sometimes called trapdoor games (Roth, 2004)) in order to 
achieve input indirection. In the simplest, users must recognize some quality 
of their password item - its color or shape for example. In more sophisticated 
systems, users must process or integrate information, such as determining 
the next tab highlight in Tan’s spy-resistant keyboard (2005). 
Finally, systems such as CHC (Wiedenback, 2006) pose even more 
complex tasks involving spatial cognition to determine what points are 
enclosed by a polygon. The security literature, as well as general HCI 
guidelines, suggests that simpler cognitive tasks are more rapidly and 
reliably performed. Recognition tasks, in which users select their password 
items from a set of visually presented possibilities, are typically viewed as 
optimal choices. As such, we suggest that multiplexed authentication systems 
should be designed around recognition tasks in order to support optimal 
performance. 
Category Count: Multiplexed schemes typically involve multiple 
orthogonal categories of password item - for example, the highlight and tiles 
of Tan’s spy-resistant keyboard (2005) or the colors and numbers of de Luca’s 
ColorPin (2010). The numbers of categories that appear vary considerably, 
ranging from the single black/white category of Roth’s PIN entry system 
(2004), to the five distinct categories of PicassoPass (van Eekelen, 2013). In 
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general, systems with a greater number of categories have more ambiguity in 
the interface and support a larger number of possible passwords. 
Consequently, it is harder for an observer to infer user password items from 
user input. However, as more categories are introduced, the complexity of 
the content increases. A likely consequence is that the conspicuity (Wertheim, 
2010), or ease with which individual elements can be distinguished or 
recognized will drop, lowering system usability. In choosing a number 
of categories to use in a system, designers need strike a balance between 
simplicity and security. 
Category Cardinality: The categories used in existing multiplexed 
systems feature very different cardinalities, or numbers of unique cues. 
In the work reviewed in this paper, category cardinality ranges from 
a minimal three colors (de Luca, 2010) to an overwhelming 42 tiles (Tan, 
2005). The implications of category cardinality are broad. For example, 
higher cardinalities increase the resistance of a password system to brute-
force attacks that attempt to exhaustively enter passwords - there are simply 
more possibilities to consider. However, higher cardinalities require greater 
search, recognition and decision time. It is easy and quick to make the binary 
distinction between Roth’s black and white keys. But in the case of the 12 
colors used in PicassoPass, its likely that the human capacity for reliable 
absolute judgment is overloaded and, even if not, well established principles, 
such as the Hick-Hyman law (Cockburn, 2007), mathematically link greater 
numbers of options to lengthier decision times. Designers need balance the 
category cardinalities they select between the constraints of the password 
space they delimitate and the ease and speed with which users can make 
selections. 
Repeated Observation: Casual observers, unlike traditional malicious 
attackers, have prolonged exposure to users, potentially seeing multiple 
password entries up close. But an inherent feature of multiplexed schemes 
is that repeat observations provide additional information that can be used 
to disambiguate a password. Ultimately, a user always enters the same 
password and, regardless of the nature of the input multiplexing, a series 
of observations will eventually provide sufficient information to determine 
that password contents. A typical stance to deal with this issue is to assume 
that the complexity of achieving this longitudinal intersection is beyond 
the means or desires of a simply casual observer (Roth, 2004). This is a fair 
point, but a closer analysis of the interrelationship between the number 
of categories in a system and their cardinalities gives more nuance to this 
issue. Basically, there is a tradeoff between these qualities. To illustrate this 
point, consider a system in which a user can choose a four-item password 
by selecting buttons, each mapped to two cue categories (e.g. numbers and 
colors) with cardinalities of ten. Although the theoretical password space 
of such a system is very large (e.g. (10*2)2), it is very weak against repeated 
observation. This is because between two authentication sessions there 
is very little chance that cues from the two categories will overlap in the 
same way. As such, an observer will likely be able to correctly determine 
the password by simply identifying the sub-set of selected cues that appear 
in both sessions - the intersection of the total cue set selected in each 
individual session. The precise probability that this intersection will fully 
reveal the password can be determined by calculating the probability of non-
mutually exclusive events where the base probability of the same pair of cues 
reappearing together is directly derived from their cardinality - 10% in this 
example. As such, with two ten-cardinality categories, the chance that one of 
four password items will repeat is just 19%. This means that more than 80% 
of the time, two observations of the system will be enough to reveal the full 
password. 
Table 1 Exploring the tradeoff between number of categories and category cardinality in 
multiplexed authentication. For a range of possible system configurations the table reports 
resistance against 1) brute force attacks based on guessing the password contents 2) key 
guessing attacks based on selecting input elements at random and 3) the probability of 
determining a password after watching a user perform a single entry. It also shows the probability 
that there will be an overlap between displayed password cues on repeated authentications in 
a multiplexed systems. This is a good guideline for gauging system resistance against casual 
observers who may see a user authenticate frequently.
In contrast, consider a system with four item categories (e.g., a number, a 
number-color, a letter and a letter-color) each with a cardinality of three. In 
this system, the password space is relatively small ((4*3)4) but the chance 
that cue items will overlap across multiple authentication sessions, calculated 
as a non-mutually exclusive probability, is relatively high (80%). 
As such it offers improved resistance to repeat observation, and particularly 
to casual non-malicious observers who are exposed to multiple sessions 
but take no notes and make no persistent efforts. This tradeoff, basically a 
balancing of resilience against observation with resistance to brute force 
attack is a final important design consideration for multiplexed password 
systems. To more fully characterize this issue, Table 1 presents figures for the 
security of multiplexed systems with a range of different category count and 
Categories Cues
Brute force 
(1 in …)
Key guessing
 (1 in …)
Probability to
crack after
1 observation
Probability
of intersection
Notes
1 10 10000 10000 100 0% Standard PIN
2 4 4096 256 6.3% 43% Security weak also 
for casual observer.2 5 10000 625 6.3% 36%
4 4 65536 256 0.4% 68%
Guessing VS 
Observation attack
 trade-off
4 5 160000 625 0.4% 59% ShaPIN
5 4 331776 256 0.1% 82% Strong security but 
compromised 
usability6 5 810000 625 0.1% 73%
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force attacks that attempt to exhaustively enter passwords - there are simply 
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such as the Hick-Hyman law (Cockburn, 2007), mathematically link greater 
numbers of options to lengthier decision times. Designers need balance the 
category cardinalities they select between the constraints of the password 
space they delimitate and the ease and speed with which users can make 
selections. 
Repeated Observation: Casual observers, unlike traditional malicious 
attackers, have prolonged exposure to users, potentially seeing multiple 
password entries up close. But an inherent feature of multiplexed schemes 
is that repeat observations provide additional information that can be used 
to disambiguate a password. Ultimately, a user always enters the same 
password and, regardless of the nature of the input multiplexing, a series 
of observations will eventually provide sufficient information to determine 
that password contents. A typical stance to deal with this issue is to assume 
that the complexity of achieving this longitudinal intersection is beyond 
the means or desires of a simply casual observer (Roth, 2004). This is a fair 
point, but a closer analysis of the interrelationship between the number 
of categories in a system and their cardinalities gives more nuance to this 
issue. Basically, there is a tradeoff between these qualities. To illustrate this 
point, consider a system in which a user can choose a four-item password 
by selecting buttons, each mapped to two cue categories (e.g. numbers and 
colors) with cardinalities of ten. Although the theoretical password space 
of such a system is very large (e.g. (10*2)2), it is very weak against repeated 
observation. This is because between two authentication sessions there 
is very little chance that cues from the two categories will overlap in the 
same way. As such, an observer will likely be able to correctly determine 
the password by simply identifying the sub-set of selected cues that appear 
in both sessions - the intersection of the total cue set selected in each 
individual session. The precise probability that this intersection will fully 
reveal the password can be determined by calculating the probability of non-
mutually exclusive events where the base probability of the same pair of cues 
reappearing together is directly derived from their cardinality - 10% in this 
example. As such, with two ten-cardinality categories, the chance that one of 
four password items will repeat is just 19%. This means that more than 80% 
of the time, two observations of the system will be enough to reveal the full 
password. 
Table 1 Exploring the tradeoff between number of categories and category cardinality in 
multiplexed authentication. For a range of possible system configurations the table reports 
resistance against 1) brute force attacks based on guessing the password contents 2) key 
guessing attacks based on selecting input elements at random and 3) the probability of 
determining a password after watching a user perform a single entry. It also shows the probability 
that there will be an overlap between displayed password cues on repeated authentications in 
a multiplexed systems. This is a good guideline for gauging system resistance against casual 
observers who may see a user authenticate frequently.
In contrast, consider a system with four item categories (e.g., a number, a 
number-color, a letter and a letter-color) each with a cardinality of three. In 
this system, the password space is relatively small ((4*3)4) but the chance 
that cue items will overlap across multiple authentication sessions, calculated 
as a non-mutually exclusive probability, is relatively high (80%). 
As such it offers improved resistance to repeat observation, and particularly 
to casual non-malicious observers who are exposed to multiple sessions 
but take no notes and make no persistent efforts. This tradeoff, basically a 
balancing of resilience against observation with resistance to brute force 
attack is a final important design consideration for multiplexed password 
systems. To more fully characterize this issue, Table 1 presents figures for the 
security of multiplexed systems with a range of different category count and 
Categories Cues
Brute force 
(1 in …)
Key guessing
 (1 in …)
Probability to
crack after
1 observation
Probability
of intersection
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cardinality configurations. It considers different types of attack including 
brute-force, key guessing (just selecting keys or icons, rather than actual 
possible password items, at random) and observation.
5. ShaPIN prototype
In order to instantiate and explore these recommendations, we designed and 
developed two variations of ShaPIN, a multiplexed authentication system 
based on compound icons and shown in Figure 2. Practically, ShaPIN is 
composed of a five by five grid of icons intended for use with a touchscreen so 
that users can directly tap the icons to make selections. It was implemented 
on the Samsung Galaxy II Smartphone. Navigating the tradeoff between 
susceptibility to brute force and observation attacks presented in Table 1, we 
created four categories of information associated with each icon, each with a 
cardinality of five. The categories are: numbers (1-5), letters (A-E), colors (red, 
green, blue, yellow, cyan) and shapes (circle, square, triangle, four-pointed 
star and five-pointed star). 
 
<Figure 2 > Screenshots of the direct ShaPIN (top) and partially indirect ShaPIN (bottom) 
interfaces. Both systems feature five cue categories (numbers, letters, shapes and colors) 
each with a cardinality of five items that are randomly but equally distributed over 25 
selectable icons. In the direct interface all cues are shown within the icons, while in the 
indirect interface numbers and letters are associated with rows and columns to reduce 
visual clutter. The pictures above show how to insert a PIN composed of 4 items for each 
of the two password input systems. 
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Both systems feature five cue categories (numbers, letters, shapes and colors) each with a 
cardinality of five items that are randomly but equally distributed over 25 selectable icons. In the 
direct interface all cues are shown within the icons, while in the indirect interface numbers and 
letters are associated with rows and columns to reduce visual clutter. The pictures above show 
how to insert a PIN compos d of 4 items for each of the two password input system .
Randomization is kept to a minimum and occurs only at the start of each 
authentication session. It involves each icon being assigned one value from 
each category with the constraint that every value from very category 
appears exactly five times over the entire grid. Finally, to explore the value 
of input directness in relation to the cost of increasing the density of visual 
information, we created a fully direct interface (Figure 2, left), in which cue 
assignments are fully random over the grid, and a partially indirect interface 
(Figure 2, right), in which numbers are shown at the top and bottom of 
the icon grid and letters to the left and right. Accordingly these cues are 
associated with their respective columns and rows of icons. In both versions 
of the system, password items are composed of four items from any of the 
categories. The interfaces also include a status bar to show progress as well 
as enter and cancel buttons.
6. Evaluation
We conducted two studies of the ShaPIN systems, assessing usability and 
security against observation. In the usability study, 12 student participants 
were compensated with approximately 5 USD to perform 20 authentications 
with each system in a fully balanced repeated measures design. The first five 
authentications were discarded as practice and we captured task times and 
error rates from the remaining 15 trials. If participants made an error, they 
were required to re-complete the trial. In total, the study involved entry of 
360 correct passwords or 1440 correct password items. The results indicated 
the direct interface led to a mean task completion time of 5.81 seconds (SD: 
1.24), while the partially indirect interface recorded 6.51 seconds (SD: 1.67), a 
difference that a paired t-test determined was significant (p=0.038). 
Error rates for both systems were too low for formal analysis. A total of 
just four errors were recorded in the direct system (2.2%) and two errors 
in the indirect system (1.1%). Based on these data we concluded that the 
usability of the ShaPIN system is generally good. Compared to prior work 
on multiplexed authentication it is rapid and errors rates are extremely low 
for experimental settings. The direct interface shows modest, but significant 
improvements (12%) in completion time compared to the partially indirect 
system, suggesting that, in this case at least, a fully direct interface remains 
more readily intelligible than the less cluttered indirect version. 
In the security study, two new participants completed five authentications 
with each system. During this process, one attacker was also present and free 
to visually observe the user’s input in any way they choose. An experimenter 
also recorded unobstructed video of the device screen. To more closely 
resemble casual observers, attackers were selected to be students with no 
background in security and were furthermore prevented from taking notes 
of any form. After users completed five authentications, attackers were 
immediately given five attempts to enter the password. In the final stage 
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assignments are fully random over the grid, and a partially indirect interface 
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the icon grid and letters to the left and right. Accordingly these cues are 
associated with their respective columns and rows of icons. In both versions 
of the system, password items are composed of four items from any of the 
categories. The interfaces also include a status bar to show progress as well 
as enter and cancel buttons.
6. Evaluation
We conducted two studies of the ShaPIN systems, assessing usability and 
security against observation. In the usability study, 12 student participants 
were compensated with approximately 5 USD to perform 20 authentications 
with each system in a fully balanced repeated measures design. The first five 
authentications were discarded as practice and we captured task times and 
error rates from the remaining 15 trials. If participants made an error, they 
were required to re-complete the trial. In total, the study involved entry of 
360 correct passwords or 1440 correct password items. The results indicated 
the direct interface led to a mean task completion time of 5.81 seconds (SD: 
1.24), while the partially indirect interface recorded 6.51 seconds (SD: 1.67), a 
difference that a paired t-test determined was significant (p=0.038). 
Error rates for both systems were too low for formal analysis. A total of 
just four errors were recorded in the direct system (2.2%) and two errors 
in the indirect system (1.1%). Based on these data we concluded that the 
usability of the ShaPIN system is generally good. Compared to prior work 
on multiplexed authentication it is rapid and errors rates are extremely low 
for experimental settings. The direct interface shows modest, but significant 
improvements (12%) in completion time compared to the partially indirect 
system, suggesting that, in this case at least, a fully direct interface remains 
more readily intelligible than the less cluttered indirect version. 
In the security study, two new participants completed five authentications 
with each system. During this process, one attacker was also present and free 
to visually observe the user’s input in any way they choose. An experimenter 
also recorded unobstructed video of the device screen. To more closely 
resemble casual observers, attackers were selected to be students with no 
background in security and were furthermore prevented from taking notes 
of any form. After users completed five authentications, attackers were 
immediately given five attempts to enter the password. In the final stage 
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of the study, the casual observer constraint was relaxed and attackers were 
presented with the video clips and asked to use any technique they wished 
to extract the passwords. There were allowed unlimited time and asked 
to provide a list of their top three guesses as to the password contents. In 
the shoulder-surfing portion of the study one attacker successfully entered 
the users password in the partially indirect ShaPIN interface three times 
(first, second and fourth attempts), suggesting she had partially cracked 
the password but remained uncertain regarding one or more of the items. 
Neither attacker cracked the direct interface. In the video portion of the 
study, one attacker cracked both passwords, while the other cracked one 
and correctly identified three PIN items in the second. They achieved this 
performance with their first guesses, clearly highlighting the weakness of 
the system against camera attack. In order to explain how the password 
was cracked in the partially indirect interface during shoulder surfing, we 
examined the password contents. It featured two numbers, one letter and 
one color. Examination of the video of this entry revealed that the user 
always selected each of the three alphanumeric cues by tapping on one of the 
appropriate edges of the grid - directly adjacent to the number or character 
in his password. We suggest that this additional cue was sufficient to readily 
reveal these three password items to the attacker. This finding highlights 
users’ reliance on clear spatial mappings during interface use and reinforces 
the simplicity and benefits of direct mapping in multiplexed authentication 
systems. 
In summary, these two studies validate the design guidelines presented 
in this article. By identifying the salient design issues in the space of 
multiplexed authentication we were able to create simple, effective systems 
that users could use rapidly and reliably. Compared to prior work on this 
topic, ShaPIN task times and error rates are laudably low. For example, some 
of the most rapid tasks times previously recorded for multiplexed schemes 
are from de Luca (2010) whose participants entered a password in a mean of 
13.5 seconds, more than double the speed participants attained with ShaPIN. 
Other schemes report longer entry times, from 23.3 seconds (Roth, 2004) 
through approximately 50 seconds (Tan, 2005) to 71 seconds (Wiedenback, 
2006). While these schemes vary substantially in their design, making direct 
comparisons of experimental data of questionable validity, we argue that the 
rapid entry times achived in ShaPIN serves to validate the design framework 
and guideance presented in this paper – it enabled the creation of a relatively 
rapid, effective and potentially practical viable authentication system. 
Furthermore, although the security study revealed weaknesses in one of the 
ShaPIN designs, it validated the core concept - multiplexed input makes it 
challenging for a casual observer to deduce a password, even after repeated 
viewings. However, as the video attack demonstrated, given ample time and 
access to recordings, cracking the passwords is inevitable - multiplexed input 
does not protect against dedicated and persistent attackers. It is valuable 
security technique only against single observation sessions or casual 
observers. If future designers, researchers and developers create multiplexed 
authenication schemes they need do so in light of a full and complete 
understanding of the limiations of the threat model outlined in this article. 
We argue that in other siutations multiplexed systems cannot effectively 
protect users and should not be deployed. 
7. Conclusion
This article deals with authentication techniques suitable for pervasive 
computing scenarios - on mobiles or wearables and in everyday life. It argues 
that casual observers, a term it uses to refer to collocated but non-malicious 
peers, are a ubiquitous part of many common authentication contexts such 
as home and work environments. It isolates the qualities of these individuals, 
and discusses a framework and design guidelines for multiplexed 
authentication that offers a way of concealing passwords from them. By 
reviewing prior work on this topic, it draws out key aspects of the design 
space for these systems and uses this analysis to inform the development of 
ShaPIN, a novel multiplexed authentication system. Two studies characterize 
user performance and system security against observation, ultimately 
serving to validate and further refine the framework. Specifically, this work 
reinforces our suggestions that minimizing randomization and focusing 
on direct input mappings can optimize performance without impacting 
security. The high performance levels attained with ShaPIN also suggest that 
the number of categories and category cardinalities used are appropriate 
for multiplexed authentication systems. Basically, in order to strike a good 
balance between the size of the password space in a system and its resistance 
to observation, and the visual complexity of a system against the human 
capacity for absolute judgment, we recommend that future designers focus 
on multiplexed systems with approximately four to six categories, each with 
a cardinality of four to six items. 
In conclusion, we believe that the work in this paper shows the promise of 
multiplexed authentication systems for securing against casual observers. 
We hope that future developers and designers are able to build on the 
framework presented in this paper to create new authentication systems that 
allow users, as well as their colleagues, peers, family and friends, to freely 
enter their passwords, safe from embarrassment and able to look wherever 
they please. 
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one color. Examination of the video of this entry revealed that the user 
always selected each of the three alphanumeric cues by tapping on one of the 
appropriate edges of the grid - directly adjacent to the number or character 
in his password. We suggest that this additional cue was sufficient to readily 
reveal these three password items to the attacker. This finding highlights 
users’ reliance on clear spatial mappings during interface use and reinforces 
the simplicity and benefits of direct mapping in multiplexed authentication 
systems. 
In summary, these two studies validate the design guidelines presented 
in this article. By identifying the salient design issues in the space of 
multiplexed authentication we were able to create simple, effective systems 
that users could use rapidly and reliably. Compared to prior work on this 
topic, ShaPIN task times and error rates are laudably low. For example, some 
of the most rapid tasks times previously recorded for multiplexed schemes 
are from de Luca (2010) whose participants entered a password in a mean of 
13.5 seconds, more than double the speed participants attained with ShaPIN. 
Other schemes report longer entry times, from 23.3 seconds (Roth, 2004) 
through approximately 50 seconds (Tan, 2005) to 71 seconds (Wiedenback, 
2006). While these schemes vary substantially in their design, making direct 
comparisons of experimental data of questionable validity, we argue that the 
rapid entry times achived in ShaPIN serves to validate the design framework 
and guideance presented in this paper – it enabled the creation of a relatively 
rapid, effective and potentially practical viable authentication system. 
Furthermore, although the security study revealed weaknesses in one of the 
ShaPIN designs, it validated the core concept - multiplexed input makes it 
challenging for a casual observer to deduce a password, even after repeated 
viewings. However, as the video attack demonstrated, given ample time and 
access to recordings, cracking the passwords is inevitable - multiplexed input 
does not protect against dedicated and persistent attackers. It is valuable 
security technique only against single observation sessions or casual 
observers. If future designers, researchers and developers create multiplexed 
authenication schemes they need do so in light of a full and complete 
understanding of the limiations of the threat model outlined in this article. 
We argue that in other siutations multiplexed systems cannot effectively 
protect users and should not be deployed. 
7. Conclusion
This article deals with authentication techniques suitable for pervasive 
computing scenarios - on mobiles or wearables and in everyday life. It argues 
that casual observers, a term it uses to refer to collocated but non-malicious 
peers, are a ubiquitous part of many common authentication contexts such 
as home and work environments. It isolates the qualities of these individuals, 
and discusses a framework and design guidelines for multiplexed 
authentication that offers a way of concealing passwords from them. By 
reviewing prior work on this topic, it draws out key aspects of the design 
space for these systems and uses this analysis to inform the development of 
ShaPIN, a novel multiplexed authentication system. Two studies characterize 
user performance and system security against observation, ultimately 
serving to validate and further refine the framework. Specifically, this work 
reinforces our suggestions that minimizing randomization and focusing 
on direct input mappings can optimize performance without impacting 
security. The high performance levels attained with ShaPIN also suggest that 
the number of categories and category cardinalities used are appropriate 
for multiplexed authentication systems. Basically, in order to strike a good 
balance between the size of the password space in a system and its resistance 
to observation, and the visual complexity of a system against the human 
capacity for absolute judgment, we recommend that future designers focus 
on multiplexed systems with approximately four to six categories, each with 
a cardinality of four to six items. 
In conclusion, we believe that the work in this paper shows the promise of 
multiplexed authentication systems for securing against casual observers. 
We hope that future developers and designers are able to build on the 
framework presented in this paper to create new authentication systems that 
allow users, as well as their colleagues, peers, family and friends, to freely 
enter their passwords, safe from embarrassment and able to look wherever 
they please. 
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